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Abstract 
 
In order to most effectively control wildlife at an airfield, airport managers must first identify and prioritize 
the hazards posed by the different species present in their environment. A formula including ten primary 
risk factors is presented in order to determine the relative threat posed by individual species or groups of 
similar species. The ten primary risk factors are: 
1) The overall population of the wildlife species (in total number of individuals) 
2) The size (mass and surface area) of an individual animal within the species 
3) The average number of animals encountered (i.e. average group size) 
4) The amount of time spent in the airfield environment (migration, hibernation, etc.) 
5) The time of day when the species is most active 
6) The location of the species with respect to flight operations (AGL, distance from runways, etc.) 
7) The time spent by the species in the air or actively moving 
8) The number of reported strikes involving the species 
9) The ability of the species to actively avoid aircraft collisions 
10) The ability to actually influence the species through wildlife control 
 
This assessment can be utilized to provide a list of wildlife species at an airfield that pose the greatest risk 
to aviation and the order in which they should be addressed in a wildlife control program. This list can 
then be used to prioritize wildlife control activities and serve as an index to help determine the overall 
effort and money that should be spent on assuaging the strike hazard of any particular species. While 
only a guideline, this formula can serve as an effective method of setting wildlife control priorities at an 
airfield. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Risk Assessment, Priorities, Hazard Analysis, Wildlife Control, Bird strike Factors, Species, 
Relative Threat 
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Risk Analysis 
 
In order to effectively control wildlife at an airfield, airport managers must first identify and prioritize the 
hazards posed by the different species present in their environment. The model formula proposed allows 
airport operators to carry out a professional risk assessment of wildlife on their airfield and develop a 
wildlife control protocol for dealing with these risks in the most efficient and productive manner. It can be 
used to evaluate all species at an airfield, so that a uniform, relative risk evaluation for the species can be 
determined, and effective control measures developed to address those risks. This assessment can be 
completed in order to provide a list of the species at an airfield that pose the greatest risk to aviation and 
the order in which they should be addressed in a wildlife control program. Not all species are equally 
hazardous to flight operations and the risk analysis should be completed with consideration of ten factors. 
One must take into account a significant number of criteria when determining the order that the species 
fall into and exactly how they might affect the overall operation of aircraft at any particular airfield. To this 
end, airport managers should consider the following factors in establishing the priority of wildlife control 
on their airfields: 
 
1) The overall population of the wildlife species (in total number of individuals) 
 
Population size may appear to be an obvious consideration when determining the overall threat to aircraft 
operations posed by a particular wildlife species, however many times, airport managers do not conduct 
accurate and quantifiable surveys in order to determine the absolute number of individuals involved. 
Accurate determination of species presence becomes important in not only assessing the direct danger 
posed by a particular species but also is critical in assisting airport managers in assigning relative risk 
status to that species and prioritizing its control in their overall wildlife control program. Obviously, the 
greater the number of individuals present in the environment, the greater the likelihood of striking an 
aircraft. Higher numbers of animals do not always translate directly into a greater threat to aircraft, but it is 
reasonable to assume the odds of striking one of 20,000 starlings is much greater than hitting one of two 
great blue herons. Therefore, the species that have the highest number of individuals found within an 
airfield’s environment are assigned higher risk factor in the relative risk hazard compilation.  
 
Total numbers should be measured by valid survey count protocols, though purely empirical studies may 
not be possible (or advisable) in light of the overall mission to protect aircraft operations. Population 
counts conducted during routine wildlife patrols may be sufficient to gauge total numbers, as long as the 
patrols cover the entire airfield environment and are carried out in a prescribed, systematic manner. 
Oftentimes, without complete surveys, species numbers can be underrepresented in casual observations, 
and hence, not addressed properly in the wildlife control program. Assumptions based on these types of 
observations may result in an airport operator overlooking a serious risk factor. As an example, at an 
Israeli Air Force base in northern Israel, the bird strike threat posed by birds was considered to be present 
during daylight hours on or near the runways. It was assumed that most birds in the area did not fly at 
night and therefore, bird control after dark was not afforded serious consideration at the airfield. However, 
this was not the case, as thousands of birds sought refuge each night on the airfield habitat, coming in to 
roost in the trees just before sunset and leaving early in the morning just prior to sunrise. Only after 
routine evening patrols were established and direct surveys conducted was the concern actually 
discovered (and later rectified).  
 
2) The size (mass and surface area) of an individual animal within that species 
 
Simplistically, the size of an individual animal striking an aircraft is proportional to its body size – directly 
correlated to surface area - but more notably, it is generally correlated with the avoidance capabilities of a 
particular species. Hence, a 6-oz. swallow has a much greater speed and movement capability than does 
a 15-lb. Canada goose, thereby decreasing the risk of being struck by a passing plane. This factor is not 
an absolute as there are some smaller, slow-moving animals and vice versa, but as a general rule of 
thumb, the correlation holds true. Meadowlarks and curlews are examples of smaller-sized birds that are 
highly inept at avoiding oncoming aircraft. Their patterns of flight, along with their inefficient flight 
movements make them highly susceptible to being struck by an oncoming aircraft. Typically though, 
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larger birds have a more difficult time in attaining flight momentum and need a wider turn radius, resulting 
in a higher bird strike rate. 
 
However, even more important to the overall equation is the fact the larger an animal’s body mass, the 
more significant damage it could impart to an aircraft. In prioritizing the wildlife strike hazards on an 
airfield, an animal’s mass plays a large part in the determination. The force of a bird striking an aircraft is 
dependent on the velocity of the aircraft (the speed of the bird is generally much smaller) and the mass of 
the bird. The equation e=1/2mv2, where the resultant kinetic force imparted to the aircraft is one-half of 
the mass of the bird times the velocity at impact squared, represents the potential damage that a bird can 
inflict on an aircraft. There could be 200 separate bird strikes at an airfield  involving single sparrows, 
starlings, or larks but the damage that they are likely to inflict to a 747 is relatively insignificant. A single 
bird strike involving a large Canada goose, on the other hand, could wreak havoc on even the largest of 
planes, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars to repair and potentially risking the lives of the crew and 
passengers onboard. Concentrating efforts on eliminating the presence of 50 swallows, for example, 
scattered throughout an airfield may not be as important as focusing on removing a lone duck in a ditch. 
 
3) The average number of animals encountered (i.e. average group size) 
 
There are actually two sides to this variable, though in the majority of cases, those birds that travel in 
flocks are potentially more of a hazard to aircraft operations than those that move about in small groups 
or individually. Birds traveling in flocks are often confined in their overall movements to the vagaries of the 
flock – where they flock goes, they follow. A bird traveling along within a large flock may not have the 
spatial surroundings to actively avoid an oncoming plane. Reducing the freedom of escape paths and the 
ability to maneuver in a crowd results in a higher risk potential to aircraft, as not every individual in a 
group may be capable of avoiding a collision. Individuals within a flock are also not as vigilant and may 
have slower reaction times due to the complacency of traveling in a large group. The old saying “There is 
safety in numbers” may be true for protection against predators trying to single out an individual in a large 
group but is not true for thwarting large aircraft on a collision course. 
 
More importantly, the number of birds in a group can greatly affect the overall “size” of the strike. A 
collision or ingestion of a large number of smaller birds may be equivalent to hitting a single larger bird – 
as the mass of the birds is additive. Ingesting several 
dozen starlings into an engine can be as damaging as 
ingesting a much larger single duck. Because of the 
flocking nature of birds and the fact that both birds and 
airplane are traveling through space instead of 
presenting stationary targets, some bird encounters 
can involve more than 100 birds at a time. These types 
of collisions can be as serious, if not more so, than 
other types of bird strikes involving larger birds. 
 
The other side to this is the fact that larger 
conglomerations are easier to see and pilots may be 
able to actively avoid them if they are capable of 
detecting them at a distance. Flocks of birds are also 
generally more predictable in their behavior patterns 
and pilots may be able to plan their routes away from 
the flocking birds. 
 
4) The amount of time spent in the airfield environment (migration, hibernation, etc.) 
 
The amount of time spent in the environment will also play a factor in determining overall risk to aircraft by 
the species, as the more time the animal spends in the habitat, the higher the odds of it becoming 
involved in a collision. A bird that passes through the area and may only be spotted near the airdrome 
once obviously poses much less of a risk than one that spends all year in the local environment. The 
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average number of days in the year that a species is present is a reasonable factor in analyzing to what 
degree an animal will be in harm’s way.  
 
5) The time of day when the species is most active 
 
Related to the amount of time spent in the area is the role of the activity 
levels and timing of the species, particularly since many airfield flight 
regimens are based quite heavily on normal business of operating hours. 
Birds that are most active during the heaviest times flight operations pose 
a significantly higher risk of bird strikes than do those that are active 
outside the regular flight time parameters. Obviously the day of the week 
is not of consequence (weekdays vs. weekend days), as wildlife does not 
distinguish between arbitrary daily designations. However, diurnal and 
nocturnal behavior patterns are highly significant, as those birds and 
wildlife that are active at night should not typically be exposed to as many 
potential strike situations as those species that are primarily active during 
the day. In order for a bird strike to occur, both bird and plane must not 
only be in the same place as one another but they must also be there at 
the same time. If either factor does not coincide, there will not be an 
incident. Simplistically, a bird can cross a runway frequently without 
posing a threat, as long as it does so when planes are not operating in that particular area of the 
airdrome.  
 
6) The location of the species with respect to flight operations (AGL, distance from 
runways, etc.) 
 
The location of the wildlife species is also critical in determining its potential threat to aircraft operations. 
Those species that do not venture inside the aircraft operating area (AOA) or do not seek out locations 
near active movement areas do not pose as much of a strike hazard as those that may forage on the 
runways or in the drainage ditches alongside taxiways. Complicating this is the 3-D spatial component of 
the movement of the species. Those species that may be located farther from the active parts of the AOA 
but fly at great heights may pose more of a threat than a species that spends its time within the AOA but 
does not fly very far off the ground. Snow geese, for example, travel at much greater heights than do 
plovers. Even though a snow goose may rarely spend time on a particular airfield and a plover may spend 
an excessive amount of time within the confines of the AOA, the snow goose can actually pose a much 
greater threat since it flies at heights that coincide with aircraft flying altitudes and the plover may not fly 
more than several feet off the ground. Thus the odds of striking a plover are only significant when a plane 
is on landing or takeoff and even if a significant number of plovers are present on an airfield, if they are 
located well away from the runways and rarely spend time near movement areas, their hazard scores can 
be minimal. The score for snow geese in this factor can be much higher since they fly at considerable 
heights that may cross both approach and takeoff glidepaths, as well as “go arounds”, low level 
approaches, or any general flight below several thousand feet.  
 
Even approach and takeoff patterns of aircraft can be a factor in formulating the degree of risk posed by a 
particular species. Determining that a particular species of birds is normally located “x” meters from the 
active runway may not be an equivalent risk to another species that is equidistant from the runway but in 
a very different portion of the airdrome. If a particular population of birds is located in a very specific 
sector of the airfield (along a river bordering the airfield, for example), flight operations for that particular 
airfield may dictate that the risk assessment would actually be minimized or exaggerated. A bird located 
100 meters off to the side of a runway poses a very different threat than one situated 100 meters off the 
approach end of the same runway. This positional effect is particularly true for military airdromes where 
fighter aircraft operate, as takeoffs for fighters are normally quite precipitous. If prevailing winds routinely 
prescribe a specific takeoff direction, the presence of a bird species at either the takeoff or approach end 
of the runway may make a significant difference in the threat to the aircraft.  
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7) The time spent by the species in the air or actively moving 
 
An additional factor that must be weighed in the 
determination of hazard scores is the time spent in the air 
by the bird species (or actively moving about the airfield 
in the case of wildlife hazards). Those species of birds 
that spend a great deal of their time foraging on the 
ground or rarely change locations do not pose as great of 
a threat as those species that move about the airfield 
frequently. If an individual animal doesn’t move, it isn’t 
likely to be hit. Again, in order for a bird strike to take 
place, both bird and plane must share the same airspace 
at the same moment in time. Since at the majority of 
airfields, planes spend little time moving about on the 
ground at high speeds and any incident involving a 
taxiing aircraft is most likely inconsequential (birds can also readily avoid slow-moving planes on the 
ground), the more time a bird spends in the air, the more likely its path will cross that of an aircraft. 
 
8) The number of reported strikes involving the species 
 
History is also a great predictor of future occurrences. Ideally it would immensely useful to evaluate prior 
bird strikes over the course of several years at an individual airfield. Knowing what bird or wildlife species 
have caused greater numbers of strikes at the airfield environment is generally quite predictive of futures 
problems, assuming conditions and/or control methods have not radically changed. Oftentimes however, 
an airport manager does not have a detailed and extensive data collection of reported strikes at their 
disposal and so they must rely upon figures provided by the FAA or a similar entity. In the FAA’s National 
Wildlife Strike Database, rankings of the numbers of strikes have been compiled and are shown below. 
Not all species may be represented in each airfield’s environment so those species should obviously be 
eliminated from the final hazard formulations, but overall, the database provides a relative strike risk for 
general categories of species. 
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Strike Rate Data (Based on data from FAA National Wildlife Strike Database, 1/91 – 5/98) 
Species Group Strikes 
Reported 
% with 
Damage 
% with Major 
Damage 
% with Effect on 
Flight 
Gulls 2599 20 8 18 
Blackbirds/Starlings 1052 6 2 10 
Sparrows 622 2 <1 6 
Geese 532 56 21 32 
Hawks 452 25 7 21 
Ducks 401 41 13 23 
Deer 367 87 46 77 
Rock Dove 346 20 11 20 
Herons 215 20 6 20 
Swallows 209 1 <1 3 
Shorebirds 196 11 2 11 
Owls 171 17 7 10 
Vultures 152 67 24 40 
Crows/Ravens 149 11 4 11 
Mourning Dove 139 16 9 10 
American Kestrel 138 11 9 10 
Coyote 49 13 3 26 
Cranes 28 56 20 25 
Eagles 24 38 5 23 
Osprey 18 50 18 36 
Pelicans 17 53 13 27 
 
9) The ability of the species to actively avoid aircraft collisions 
 
Not all birds are created equal and not all species are equally capable of actively avoiding a collision with 
an oncoming aircraft or staying out of the way of aircraft movement areas altogether. Crows, for example, 
are quite adept at avoiding aircraft, as are northern harriers, American kestrels, and ravens. Others, like 
storks, curlews, and geese are notoriously unskilled at avoiding impacts with faster aircraft (though with 
geese, it can depend on their location and flight status). Those species that are able to actively avoid 
oncoming aircraft do not warrant high hazard scores and thereby do not justify as much attention as other 
species. 
 
10) The ability to actually influence the species through wildlife control 
 
Though all efforts can be placed upon clearing the airdrome of each and every bird, not all species 
respond to the forms of harassment used in a wildlife control program. Some birds respond to 
harassment by vacating the area and returning on the rare occasion or not at all. Others are more difficult 
to exorcise and continue to return (or do not leave the AOA at all) when harassed (irrespective of the 
method of control used). Since many airport managers do not employ lethal means to remove animals 
from the airfield, they are held to utilizing the various forms of harassment at their disposal. Geese, for 
example, respond very well to the presence of a Border Collie and vacate the area promptly. Red-winged 
blackbirds on the other hand may leave for short periods but return the next day or sometimes, hours 
later. Swallows and swifts respond very little to any form of harassment and rarely even shift to another 
area of the airfield after being harassed. 
 
Final Formulation 
 
A risk assessment rating system is applied to each species in order to determine a risk "value". In order to 
determine this risk value, each of the above risk factors should be evaluated for each species (or group of 
similar species – all species of “ducks” for example, may be able to be consolidated into one category 
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and treated as a single unit) and ranked proportionately on a scale from 1 to 100 (100 percent being the 
most significant threat for that factor present on the airdrome – all other species are expressed as a 
percentage of the highest risk species). Inversely proportional scores should be used for the final two 
factors (ability to avoid collisions and ability to control the species) since these risks are inversely related 
to the other risk factors (e.g the ability to control a species is inversely related to its ultimate risk to aircraft 
operations). The resultant scores for a species should then be multiplied together to derive a final risk 
score (“R”).  
 
The formula that describes this relationship is as follows; 
R =log x 
where x = Overall Population Size x Mass of Individual x Group Size x Time on Airfield x Time of Day x 
Location x Degree of Movement x Strike History x Avoidance Ability (inv.) x Ability to Control (inv.) 
Below is a typical tabulation for one species at an airfield (results will vary for each airfield habitat, even 
for identical species). 
 
Species 
Group 
Pop Size Group Time 
Spent 
Time 
Of Day 
Location Movement Strikes Avoid 
 (inv) 
Control 
  (inv)  
Canada 
Geese 
90 30 100 100 100 100 100 21 90 100 
 
The final risk score in this example would be (log 5.10318), or 18.71. The scores for all species are 
tabulated in this manner and ranked accordingly. Categorizing these final risk values (as high, moderate , 
or low, for example) is useful, but the most practical application of the risk values is their relative 
significance to one another. Because each person conducting this assessment will evaluate the factors in 
a slightly different manner and assign risk variables based on their own experience and perceptions, the 
risk values can vary from person to person. Therefore, the most useful application of the analysis is the 
relative relationship of risk values for each species on the airfield environment. It is helpful to assign the 
species with the highest overall risk ranking in the final tabulation a value of 100 percent and all other 
species as a proportional risk of that value. A “relative hazard percentage” is based on a percentage 
scale, starting with the highest priority species at 100 percent and working downward (hence, a species 
with a score of 52 percent of the score of the top-ranked species is 52 percent as much of a risk as that 
species). 
 
Once the risk values have been determined in this manner for all species identified, there will be a 
prioritized range of values. This allows an airport manager to develop a wildlife control program that can 
deal with all significant risks, but with an emphasis on those species that are rated highest. Ultimately, 
this can serve as an index to help determine the overall effort and money that should be spent on control 
of each species in the wildlife control program.  
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A Case Study – Dover Air Force Base 
 
The following chart is the resulting ranking based on the hazard scores from the species (or group of 
species) on or near Dover AFB in Dover, Delaware. The two scores, the overall ranking and the relative 
hazard percentage, are compilations of all of the above described risk factors.  
 
Species Group Overall Risk Ranking Relative Hazard 
Percentage 
Canada Geese 1 100 
Snow Geese 2 94 
Seagulls (all species) 3 8 
Ducks (all species) 4 6 
Vultures 5 5 
Flocking Birds * 6 4 
Raptors 7 1 
Egrets/Herons 8 1 
Crows 9 <1 
Songbirds 10 <1 
Shorebirds 11 <1 
Kestrels 12 <1 
Owls 13 <1 
Swallows 14 <1 
Groundhogs 15 <1 
Deer 16 <1 
Foxes 17 <1 
Rabbits 18 <1 
  
* Flocking birds consists of species such as red-winged blackbirds, starlings, grackles, etc. 
 
The primary reason for conducting a risk assessment and prioritization in this manner is the possibility of 
discovering risks (or lack thereof) that may not be readily apparent in general field observations or that 
may be counterintuitive to existing wildli fe control protocol. Concentration on particular populations of 
birds may be ultimately more productive than generalized control of all species on the airdrome. Similarly, 
it may behoove airport managers to focus their control efforts on the usage of specific forms of 
harassment or habitat management, in order to most effectively utilize their staff or resources. Analysis of 
this type may also help managers in determining whether or not to purchase or implement particular 
control procedures or methodologies (such as the institution of a long-grass policy or purchase of trained 
Border Collies) on their airfields. 
 
As an example, a few interesting items that were discovered from the summary data at Dover AFB: 
 
1) Overall, the geese (Canada geese and snow geese) comprise roughly 97 percent of the serious 
strike threat to the C-5 fleet at Dover AFB. Control of these individuals should be the highest 
priority and their complete exclusion from the airfield and patrol zones should be the key mission 
in the wildlife control program. The usage of Border Collies is the critical feature of Dover’s 
program that reduces this hazard.  
2) Seagulls and ducks represent the next highest threats, though their scores are less than 2 
percent of the overall threat posed by the geese (though they are 8 and 6 percent respectively of 
the threat posed by the top-ranking risk species, Canada geese). This means that roughly 2 
percent of the focus of the wildlife program should be on excluding these individuals from the 
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area. Ducks are particularly responsive to the Border Collies and the seagulls are highly 
responsive to both the dogs and remote-control airplanes (RPVs).  
3) Vultures are a minimal but justifiable concern at Dover AFB. The factor that ulimately brings their 
hazard score down is the ability to control them. Though RPVs are effective in removing the 
immediate threat of the vultures from the vicinity of the airfield, they return in the same numbers 
the next day and do not seem to be influenced in the long-term. The threat of the RPVs most 
likely is seen as an annoyance, not as a predator. The vultures’ return the next day signals this 
fact. Since the Border Collies are unable to be used effectively against the vultures (unless they 
are loafing or feeding on the ground), ultimate predatory deterrent cannot take place and the 
effect on the birds is only transitory. However, attempts to exclude vultures at almost all other 
airfields have met with dismal success and in comparison to other methods, the temporary relief 
afforded by the RPVs is outstanding. 
4) Though deer are a large and dangerous animal, they 
appear to pose minimal threat to Dover’s fleet. This is 
primarily due to the fact that there are few deer on 
the base itself and those that are within the perimeter 
do not venture from the woods located well away 
from the aircraft movement area. Since they remain 
in place, they stay out of harm’s way and are not a 
significant concern for the overall wildlife 
management program.  
5) All other animals and birds do not pose a sizeable 
strike threat to Dover’s fleet. Songbirds, for example, 
may be struck regularly but do very little damage and 
concentrating efforts on reducing their numbers 
through active measures (like with use of dogs, 
pyrotechnics, or RPVs) is inefficient because it takes 
away efforts from the more critical species 
(particularly geese). Passive measures, like habitat management and long grass policies are 
certainly helpful in reducing this strike potential but exorbitant amounts of money should not be 
spent to help alleviate the problem. 
 
Summary 
 
A risk assessment rating system is applied to each species at an airfield in order to determine a risk 
“rating”. This list should be used to prioritize wildlife control efforts and can be used as an index to help 
determine the overall effort and money that should be spent on assuaging the strike hazard of the 
particular species. While only a guideline, this formula can serve as an effective method of setting wildlife 
control priorities and may, in the long run, help airport operators improve the facilitation of wildlife control 
on their airfield. 
 
